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The public debate in Germany over the EMU 1993-98 can be divided into: a European 
identity debate, an economic debate, and a price stability debate. These debates formed a 
necessary link between German interests and the EMU. Without this link, the German 
elite may have favored a postponement of the Euro past 1999, leading to a loss in the 
momentum of the EMU or a stop in the progression of the EMU project all together.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
The question as to why Germany joined the EMU has attracted a lot of interest from a variety of 
scholars over the years. Given the advantages of the European Monetary System (EMS), the German 
economic interest in the EMU were not as clear. Many attempts to clarify the German position have 
been made, including explanations emphasising geopolitical concerns, structural economic aspects, 
path dependence, and nation-state identity. However, despite a number of extensive and diverging 
contributions, we will argue that so far no contributions have succeeded in delivering a fully 
satisfactory explanation as to why Germany joined the EMU.This is a gap, which this article attempts 
to minimize. 
 
We join the discussion by dispelling two common misconceptions, and thus provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the German position on European monetary integration. The first 
misconception is that the EMU was finalised with the Maastricht Treaty, leaving the Euro ‘locked in’. 
The second is that economic interest-based and constructivist European integration theories cannot 
compliment each other in explaining key decisions made about the EMU.    
 
One predominant misconception about the EMU process is that the decision to adopt the Euro was 
finalised with the Maastricht treaty. As a consequence, the most common period studied in relation to 
Germany and the EMU is between 1988 and 1991.1 From this view, the process towards the EMU 
started with the Hannover Summit in 1988, and was finalised with the agreement in Maastricht, in 
December of 1991. This overlooks two factors: the German Federal Constitutional Court ruling on the 
12th of October, 1993, which stated that German participation in the EMU needed to be approved by 
the Bundestag and Bundesrat on the 23rd and 24th of April 1998; and, that the German debate about 
acceptance of the EMU began to gain momentum and intensity from late 1993 in the German 
newspapers, gradually fading away again after the decision to join the EMU in the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat in April of 1998. 2  
                                                          
1 Cf. Dyson and Featherstone (1999), Moravscik (1998), Maes (2004), McNamara (1998) and Verdun (1998). 
2 However, it must be emphasised that German newspapers have only been analysed back to the beginning of 
1993 through FAZ, because the electronic archive does not extend past this point in time (Die Zeit does not 
cover 1989-1996, but goes back to 1948). Although we did not study newspapers before 1993, authors studying 
the period until 1991 (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Risse et al 1999) have identified surprisingly little public 
debate about the Euro in Germany. Concurrently, we observed very little debate through the year 1993. Even 
when the ERM in the EMS was abandoned on the 31st of July 1993, the political elites did not question the 
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Why is it important that there was a public debate about the EMU in Germany after the Maastricht 
treaty was signed? And how does this extensive debate fit into a broader understanding of the EMU in 
Germany? The existence of a public national discussion in Gernany can be seen as signifying that the 
issues being discussed were not fixed, or agreed upon. In this case, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court ruling in 1993 politicized the EMU debate in Germany for the first time when it was agreed the 
political elites would have to vote in favor of or against joining the Euro in 1998. It should be 
remembered that the initial decision to join the EMU made in Maastricht had been driven exclusively 
by the governmental elites and Bundesbank representatives at the European level with only minor 
interference from actors in the national arena (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999). Thus, the Constitutional 
court ruling in 1993 ‘brought the people in’, thereby operationalizing, for the first time, German 
preferences towards both the adoption and implementation of the Euro. While it is true that the 
Maastricht treaty may have signified that the EMU was a positive or necessary step for Europe, we 
argue that the decisions made by the Bundestag and Bundesrat in 1998 were necessary to determine a 
decision which would be in accordance with German national interests.    
 
It is also important to understand what a debate in and of itself can contribute to the process of 
European integration on a more general level. Discourse analysist Thomas Diez states that “the whole 
history of European integration can be understood as a history of speech acts establishing a system of 
governance”(Diez, 1999). The reason for this is that discourse defines what we know.3 Through 
discourse, definitions can be changed or evolve, which in turn changes our understandings or 
perceptions (Diez, 1999). Translated to the case presented here, this implies that German elites formed 
their understanding of European monetary integration and the EMU through an evolving discourse. 
The change and development in this discourse then depicts the evolution of what the German elites 
found to be important and valid in relation to the EMU, and what they considered to be invalid 
(seemingly unimportant issues not being discussed). In other words, by understanding the German 
elite discourse related to the EMU, we can also understand the German preferences towards adopting 
the Euro. 
 
Finally, it is also necessary to discuss the importance of the outcome of the public debate. We will 
show through the analysis of our empirical research that a serious discussion and fear about 
postponing the final stage of the EMU past 1999 was voiced throughout the debates of 1993 to 1998. 
The political and economic elites feared that the momentum towards finalizing the EMU could be lost 
forever if it was perceived that the EMU was not in Germany’s interest. The elites who argued in 
favour of a postponement of the EMU, past 1999, argued for postponement if the convergence criteria 
could not be fulfilled.  
 
If postponement had become the overall elite consensus at the time of the Bundestag and Bundesrat 
decisions, the introduction of the Euro would have been delayed with reference to the lack of 
convergence criteria fulfilment in several countries, including Germany. This counterfactual argument 
suggests that the course of European integration could have been altered all together due to the public 
debate, which occurred in Germany during the years of 1993 to 1998.  
 
Pertaining to the second misconception, concerning theoretical incompatibility, one of the 
contributions of this article is to demonstrate that, although we do not subscribe to the ontological 
view of rational choice, cost/benefit analysis can be included into a broader social constructivist 
framework as a norm which ‘constructs’ elite preferences. With this understanding, all of the issues 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
prospects of instituting the EMU (0.3.08.1993. F.A.Z. “Nach den Brüsseler Währungsentscheidungen spricht 
Waigel von einem ”Befreiungsschlag”). Our studies also indicate that the German EMU debate first picked up 
momentum after the rulings by Constitutional Court on the 12th of October 1993. 
3 This concept was articulated by Michel Foucault, one of the founders of discourse analysis, elaborated for the 
case of European Integration by Diez (1999). 
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and arguments which are made in the German debate over the EMU are able to be discussed 
coherently. Most theories, as we will show, apply a stringent theoretical framework when studying the 
German decision to join the EMU, thereby excluding other explanations as to why Germany joined the 
EMU. However, none of these theories has been able to fully account for the complexity of the 
German decision in favor of the EMU.  
  
In order for our analysis of the German debate to support our claims, we will need to convincingly 
demonstrate two things: first, that there was actually a debate taking place with substantial content 
about important issues at stake for Germany; second, that social constructs, which include economic 
interests, can be seen as factors having a real impact on the decisions finally taken in 1998.  
 
The following will begin with a discussion of previous explanations of European monetary integration. 
Then, we will present the approach used in the empirical analysis. The proceeding three sections 
summarise the main public debates in Germany from 1993 to 1998: the need for the Euro in order to 
maintain European identity; advocacy of the economic benefits of entering the common currency; and 
the need for maintaining price stability in Germany. The article concludes with an analysis of the three 
debates taken as a whole, and relates them to the research question: Why did German finally decide to 
join the EMU?  
 
 
1. Elite Preferences in European Monetary Integration 
 
The fact that European Monetary Integration and the EMU were elite driven processes is generally 
accepted among scholars. What are not agreed upon, however, are the factors, which led the elites to 
their decision to join the Common Currency. The main diverging explanations regarding the German 
decision to join the EMU emphasize either, geopolitical, structural economic, European national 
identity aspects or path dependence. Despite the differences in these theoretical perspectives, most of 
them share two problems: a focus exclusively on the Maastricht period (overlooking the 1998 decision 
about whether the EMU was acceptable for German interests); as well as relying heavily on only one 
theory, to the general exclusion of other theories. 
 
Garton Ash (1993) and Grieco (1995) have argued that Germany accepted European monetary 
integration because of a desire to overcome a new security dilemma in Europe, mainly with France, 
who feared Germany in the aftermath of unification. However, it has been argued by Risse et al (1999) 
and Moravscik (1998), that this theory is factually incorrect due to the fact that the German elite were 
in favour of the EMU long before reunification took place. Even though German unification might 
have been influential for German elite preferences for the EMU, German preferences for the EMU 
have been identified before unification; a point, which these theories do not elaborate on. Furthermore, 
if unification was a primary cause for German preferences towards the EMU, it would have been 
expected that this justification would have been a central theme in the German discussion in 1993-
1998. However, a link between unification and the German preferences towards the EMU has not been 
identified.   
 
Other scholars advance an almost purely rational choice economic explanation. Frieden (1998), Jones 
(1999), Loedel (1999), and Moravscik (1999) argue that the political elites were sensitive to the 
interests of economic actors in Germany. In an increasingly international liberal market setting, the 
preferences of business leaders were progressively making their way into political discourse, and 
influencing political elites in their policy decisions. What  these mainly rational-choice theorists not 
take into account is the possibility of other important explanatory factors, such as identities, norms, 
and values.         
 
However, national identity explanations have also been forwarded, emphasising aspects of preference 
formation in accounting for the behaviour of (German) decision-makers. Risse et al (1999) argue that 
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the general elite support for the single currency was based on German post-World War II identity 
‘Euro-patriotism’ which was supposed to overcome the German nationalist and militarist past once 
and for all. In other words, having a European identity by implication leads to a positive stance 
towards major steps forward in political, as well as economic, European integration – such as the 
EMU. The problem that Risse et al develop is that they reduce the German decision to a question of 
European identity hereby essentially excluding e.g. possible economic considerations underlying the 
German decision.  
 
Other scholars such as Pierson (1997) and Hall and Taylor (1996) have used arguments from 
institutional path dependence. According to this theory, an event creates positive feedback loops, 
which increase returns for continuing along the same ‘path’, and produce increasingly negative 
outcomes for diverging from the ‘path’. In the case of Germany, the argument is that the Maastricht 
Treaty left the German decision to join the EMU “locked in”, providing increasing incentives to join 
the Euro and making it increasingly costly to ‘back out’. This theory, however, does not seem to give 
enough explanatory value to the individuality and complexity as to why Germany joined the EMU. 
The EMU process was not sufficiently “locked in”, because the German Federal Constitutional Court 
ruling in 1993 lead to an understanding that further discussion was needed before the Euro could be 
accepted in Germany. 
 
These contributions by no means provide an exhaustive list of explanations. Ivo Maes, Karl 
Kaltenthaler, and Dyson/Featherstone, for example, advance views, which fall outside the four 
categories, listed above. Although diverging from the more frequent explanations, these scholars do 
share one common view that the question of securing price stability played a decisive role in the 
German decision to join the EMU.  
 
Maes (2004) argues that Keynesian policy had lost its attraction in France due to the stagflation of the 
1970s, and France was therefore siding more with German price stability policy on the EMU. Karl 
Kaltenthaler (2002) argues that German interests in European monetary integration were initiated by 
German geo-political concerns. After the Maastricht Treaty and reunification, German interests 
focused on maintaining price stability, namely through the Stability Pact proposal. Dyson and 
Featherstone (1999), in their book “Road to Maastricht” focus on political actors whose preferences 
for EMU were influenced by the ordo-liberal emphasis for maintaining price stability through tough 
convergence criteria, rules safeguarding excessive budget deficits, sanctions for noncompliant 
countries, and central bank interdependence. Dyson and Featherstone also identify a German historical 
feeling of responsibility to bring Europe together through European integration.  
 
These contributions share some common problems. As mentioned, most of the previous studies 
conducted in relation to European integration have tended to focus exclusively on the Maastricht 
period; as well as relying heavily on only one theory, thus possibly leaving out important aspects in 
other theories. A problem which often arises when attempting to demonstrate the relevance of a theory 
is that this becomes a primary concern, and the empirical evidence then becomes a tool to show the 
relevance of the theory. This phenomenon tends to exclude or ‘overlook’ facts which do not match the 
chosen theory. Although many important ideas are spelled out in these contributions, the constraints of 
whichever theory (or explanation) is chosen then demands that other important aspects are excluded 
from, or not seen as central to, the German decision.  
 
Another reason why other explanations are excluded from a particular theory stems from a difference 
in ontological stances. In the academic literature presented above, theories that explain German 
preferences, based on overcoming a security dilemma, or based purely upon economic explanations, 
operate with a rational choice ontology. National identity explanations, on the other hand, operate 
based on a social constructivist ontology, which is fundamentally in opposition to that of rationalists. 
As will be presented in our theoretical analysis, rationalist economic as well as national identity 
theories both clarify parts of the complex motives underlying the German decision to join the EMU. 
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For this reason, we have included them both in our theoretical framework, which bridges these 
otherwise ontologically opposite positions. In order to do this, we use a social constructivist 
framework, within which we view the economic rational choice considerations are understood as a 
social construction.  
 
2. Social Constructivism in relation to Rational Choice 
 
The key features of rational choice theories mentioned above are quite well known, and often applied 
to the analysis of European integration. Social constructivism, however, is a newly emerging field, 
which is, as yet, less well known and defined for the analysis of European integration. For this reason, 
we will briefly recapitulate some of the predominant understandings within social constructivist 
theories, as they have appeared in relation to the topic of integration.   
 
The term ‘social constructivism’ was first introduced in a non-integration setting in the 1960s, when 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) articulated how and why individuals construct their reality. Social 
constructivism is based on the premises that social reality is constructed and reproduced by actors 
during their daily practices; Berger and Luckmann labelled this process ‘the social construction of 
reality’. The seminal work in relation to social constructivism and European integration was 
introduced in 1999, in a special edition of the Journal of European Public Policy, where a systematic 
and focused perspective of social constructivism was applied to the study of European integration. The 
latest work within the field of social constructivism is being published by many of the same authors 
(Diez, Checkel, Risse, Marcussen, etc.) who continue to build on the concepts, which they have helped 
to develop in the 1999 special edition of the Journal of European Public Policy.  
 
Rational choice theories explain actors as driven by their rational self-interest, which cause decisions 
to be based on a (mainly) economic cost-benefit analysis. Social constructivist theories emphasise 
norms and values as being decisive for how actors perceive a particular situation, thus providing actors 
with an understanding of how they should act. This identifies a basic contrast in how the two 
theoretical  perceive actors being motivated to make decisions; one based on an economic cost-benefit 
analysis, and the other on norms and values. As identified by the scholar Richard Young, the 
relationship between rationalists and constructivist logics is one of the most pressing challenges for 
social science theory (Young, 2004).  
. 
A major ontological difference between rational-choice and social constructivist theorizing is that 
whereas the former views identities and interests of actors as exogenously given, the latter views them 
as endogenous and socially constructed through interaction. Within the ontology of rational-choice, 
ideational factors are perceived in strictly instrumental terms, useful or not for self-regarding 
individuals (units) who pursue material interests (Frieden, 1998; Jones, 1999; Loedel, 1999; and 
Moravscik, 1999). With this view actors are already fully constituted and poised in a strategic 
problem-solving mode. Contrary to the rational-choice approach, social constructivists view norms or 
social constructions not only regulating an actor’s behaviour, but also constituting the identity of 
actors in the sense of defining who ‘we’ are as members of a social community (Risse, 2004).  
 
Scholars such as Risse et al. (1999) and Marcussen et al. (1999) have used identity analysis to describe 
some main features of social constructions, which they call ‘identity constructions’. One generally 
agreed upon aspect of an identity construction is that it is stable, and that the longer a particular 
identity exists, the more stable it becomes. The reason for this stems from cognitive psychology, 
which understands individuals as wanting to find order in a chaotic world. Individuals then stereotype 
and categorize to achieve their desired order. These identity categorizations, or constructions, become 
more stable over time because people internalize them, making contradictory information less likely to 
be recognized or considered.   
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Risse et al. (1999) and Marcussen et al. (1999) also recognize individuals as making in-group and out-
group identifications as part of a social construction. In-group identification is formed because it 
allows members to feel connected by a shared sense of norms and values, creating a social construct, 
or collective identity. In order for there to be an in-group, there must also be a distinction of what 
constitutes the out-group which participants of a collective identity feel is outside of and/or in 
opposition to that of their own group.  
 
Collective identities are seen as being able to change quickly and radically during what scholars call a 
critical juncture (Checkel, 1999) (Risse et al., 1999) (Marcussen et al. 1999). A critical juncture is 
thought to occur when there is too much information present rejecting a given social construction, 
which forces the in-group into an identity crisis. This critical juncture is also thought to open a 
possibility of forming a new identity construction. Individuals who are in a position of power, and who 
come up with an alternative to the undesirable identity, are said to be entrepreneurs, able to turn their 
individually held idea into broader normative belief or new collective identity.  
 
In the absence of a critical juncture, collective identities are seen as relatively stable but still as 
changing incrementally. This gradual change can be understood through discourse analysis. The 
scholar Thomas Diez (1999) emphasizes that meanings within discourses are never fixed. Diez 
explains language as having specific meanings at specific moments in time, which change or shift over 
time, and allow development to occur. As the discourse relating to a collective identity changes or 
shifts within a political arena, the perception of the collective identity also changes or shifts, making 
new political developments possible. An example given by Milliken (1999) is that new developments 
in discourse can change policy practices. It should therefore be possible to observe the incremental 
change in a given identity, and understand why actions were taken, by observing the related discourse.  
 
The emphasis on communicative and discourse practices constitutes another feature of social 
constructivist approaches. As argued by the scholar Thomas Diez, discursive practices establish a 
relationship in which actors “understand certain problems in a certain way, and pose questions 
accordingly.”(Diez, 1999, p. 603) Although it is understood that individuals impose meaning, they do 
not act as autonomous subjects, but from a normative context in which they are situated. Elaborating 
on Habermas’ theory of communicative action, Thomas Risse (2000) has argued similarly that actors 
need to share a ‘common life world’, which supplies a collective interpretation of the world and of 
individuals themselves, as provided by language, in order to be able to act and communicate among 
themselves. The ‘life world’ enables actors to communicate through a collective understanding, which 
they can refer to when acting, deliberating, and persuading. 
 
A point crucial to our analysis is that whiele rational choice theories exclude the possibility of basing 
decisions on norms or values in a specific social context, social constructivist theories do not exclude 
the possibility that it could be the norm to take economic cost-benefit analyses into account. 
According to John Gerard Ruggie (1998), constructivism seeks to map the full array of ideational 
factors that shape actors` outlooks and behaviour, ranging from culture, to aspirations and principal 
beliefs, to cause-effect knowledge of specific policy problems (cost/benefit calculations). Similarly the 
scholars Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have also introduced the notion of “strategic social 
constructions”, in which they describe normative context as contributing to the occurrence of cost-
benefit calculations. Thus, social constructivism is viewed as an attempt to set general ideational 
parameters shaped by inter-subjectively formed identities within which more instrumental choices can 
be made (Young, 2004; Wendt, 1999).  
 
 
3. The Approach 
 
In our empirical analysis, we apply grounded theory, where theoretical categorizations are developed 
“via empirical study and abstraction, comparing on the basis of new data whether these categories fit 
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and, if necessary, reformulating the categories so that they are empirically valid.” (Milleken, 1999, 
p.234). The role played by theory in this kind of analysis is different than in most of the contributions 
reviewed above, in that the focus is placed on explaining the empirical evidence as thoroughly as 
possible, rather than focusing on the theory. 
 
Our empirical evidence consists of a mapping of the German public debate about the EMU during the 
period of 1993 to 1998, which we processed in three steps: first, identifying relevant articles; second, 
translating key quotes into English (those which characterize the dominant opinions expressed in the 
articles); and third, identifying patterns in the quotes which have been separated/condensed into three 
main debates. The dominant debates which emerged consist of: the need for the Euro in order to 
maintain European identity; the economic benefits of entering the common currency; and the need for 
maintaining price stability in Germany. These three debates comprise our theoretical 
categorization/conceptualization of the German public debate.  
 
The three main theoretical categorizations are grouped from the information gathered from German 
newspapers die Zeit, die Welt, the Frankfurter Allgemeine, and magazine der Spiegel. It is important 
to acknowledge that elite arguments for each of the following debates are often interrelated, containing 
elements of multiple debates. In one public statement, for example, elements of European identity, as 
well as price stability or economic benefits may be presented. We have identified and separated 
statements, which make the strongest arguments for each debate. Phrases or statements presented in 
the following represent the dominant features within each debate, and are separated for clarification 
purposes only.  We argue that an understanding of these debates reveals the impetus for the decisions 
made by the Bundestag and Bundesrat in 1998. A serious tone and concern about postponing the final 
stage of the EMU past 1999 was voiced throughout these debates during 1993 to 1998, which we 
argue could have lead to a belief that the EMU was not in Germany’s best interest, making the 1998 
decisions of utmost importance for Germany and the progress of the EMU.  
 
 
4. The European Identity Debate 
 
One of the prominent public debates consistently favored the Euro because of its association to 
European identity. Throughout this debate, elite statements identify individuals who were in favour of 
the EMU and European integration within the German in-group. Individuals or groups who were 
identified as being skeptical towards, or not in favor of, the EMU were placed in the out-group, which 
was identified with Germany’s national socialist past. Values and norms of European identity, namely 
European integration and peace, are also promoted during this debate. Maintaining peace through 
introducing the Euro was constructed as a value of European identity in order to overcome past 
German nationalism and to prevent conditions such as those leading to WW II. This debate was 
heavily emphasized in 1995, while 1993-94 debates were dominated by European Monetary Institute 
(EMI) placement and price stability.   
 
In 1995, Scharping and Schroeder created “enormous controversy” by allegedly discussing the 
postponement of the Euro past 19994. This allegation, whether or not it was accurate, created a strong 
reaction among other elites, who formed responses in favor of the EMU around in-group/out-group 
categorization. The minister of Foreign affairs, Klaus Kinkel (FDP), classified Scharping and 
Schroeder in the European out-group, as: “those who question the Euro by cheap populism,” which he 
                                                          
4 (F.A.Z., 31.10.1995) – A postponement of the EMU past 1999 was mentioned on several occasions up until the 
decisions to join the EMU were made in 1998.  Talk of postponing the EMU past 1999 occurred in: F.A.Z: 
29.10.1993; 05.07.1994; 28.04.1994; 14.05.1995; 15.05. 1995;  28.06. 1995; 11.10.1995; 11.11. 1995.; 
24.09.1996.; 03.12. 1996; 01.02.1997; 11.07.1997; 25.07.1997; 09.02.1998. Die Welt: 11.10.1995; 31.10.1995; 
06.01.1997; 13.03.1997; 25.03.1997; 09.04.1997; 10.04.1997; 16.05.1997; 12.06.1997; 23.06.1997; 26.06.1997; 
28.06.1997; 13.09.1997. 
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felt would lead to “a relapse into protectionism and into national quarrels.” Kinkel identified 
acceptance of the common currency with the European in-group of “good euro political spirit.”5 CDU 
Secretary-General Peter Hintze identified himself with the European in-group by describing the EMU 
as a “durable peacekeeping” mission, and depicted the out-group, such as Scharping and Schroeder, as 
people who “talk down to Europe” and therefore “harm Germany.”6   
 
In 1996, Chancellor Kohl made a speech to the Irish Parliament in connection with the European 
Council’s pending decision on the Stability and Growth Pact, classifying himself with the in-group by 
supporting European Integration. Kohl proclaimed that a German who was not in favor of integration 
was “betraying the future of his home country and also the future of Europe.”7  In 1997, Joscka 
Fischer of Bundnis 90/Die Grunen also identified the European in-group as those who could see that 
“history is Europe’s principal identity,” and that European integration (the EMU) was of extreme 
importance. Fischer also asked Germans to reject any debate about postponement of the euro past 
1999, because he believed that it could have led to a situation similar to Germany’s past.8   The 
chairman of SPD and minister president of Saarland, Oscar Lafontaine, stated that the SPD wanted to 
participate in “introducing the euro as scheduled in order to build a united Europe,” placing the SDP in 
the in-group of European identity, and thereby “overcome[ing] the national rivalries of this century.”9  
 
The importance of European identity seems to derive from a desire to overcome Germanys National 
Socialist past. Political elites as well as economic interest groups stressed that the EMU was the only 
way of maintaining European identity. As the starting date of the Euro grew nearer, the acceptance for 
EMU was also tied to the maintenance of peace in Europe. It seems that the German elites believed 
that EMU was necessary for peace, and that non-acceptance of the EMU, simply stated, would mean 
war.  
 
In 1995, SPD Member of the Bundestag, Uwe Jens, favored the Euro being launched in 1999, saying: 
“that is the way it has to be”. He also felt that a delay of the Euro would “degrade the European idea 
and vision to a foreign trade zone.”10 Here, Uwe Jens was emphasizing that the EMU was connected 
to European identity, ‘European idea and vision’, and that the Euro was necessary to uphold this 
identity. Helmut Werner, chairman of the executive committee of Mercedes, reiterated this view when 
he wrote: “There is no alternative to Monetary Union”. He referred to Monetary Union as a “great 
idea” and “vision” for Europe, and that not realizing the EMU could “perhaps even prevent it 
[European integration].”11 Here, both Uwe Jens and Helmut Werner emphasize the acceptance of the 
Euro in order to uphold European identity. 
 
In 1996, Chancellor Kohl emphasized that the Euro would ensure peace, identifying that it would be 
the best weapon “against silly national chauvinism of the past”.12 Joscka Fischer also argued that 
further European integration would be a way to avoid the struggles of the past when he stated that: 
“The alternatives are to go back to a European system of balance of power or go ahead with European 
integration,” calling the EMU a “ peaceful answer.”13 Rudolf Scharping, chairman of the SPD 
committee in Bundestag, expressed to the Bundestag in May 1997 that the Euro was important “for the 
sake of the peace and assured future of the whole continent.”14 Chancellor Kohl, during his address to 
                                                          
5 31.10.1995, F.A.Z.: Kinkel: Währungsunion ist nicht „irgendeine Idee“ 
6 31.10.1995, F.A.Z.: „Die SPD-Führung sieht sich in der Rolle des Mahners“ 
7 02.10.1996, Die Welt: “Address by  Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Dail Eireann”  
8 21.03.1997, Die Zeit: “Joscka Fischer: Warum ich für den Euro bin” 
9 03.12.1997, Die Welt: “Der SPD geht es um einen Richtungswechsel” 
10 31.10.1995, F.A.Z.: „Die SPD-Führung sieht sich in der Rolle des Mahners“  
11 02.12.1995, F.A.Z.: „Standpunkte: Helmut Werner – Keine Alternative zur Währungsunion“ 
12 23.11.1996, Die Welt: “Kohl erklaert EWU zur Schicksalsfrage” 
13 21.03.1997, Die Zeit: “Joscka Fischer: Warum ich für den Euro bin” 
14 16.05.1997, Die Welt: “Sparpolitik gefährdet Währungsunion”  
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the German Bundestag on the 23rd of April, 1998, also argued that the introduction of the EMU was 
“an important building block for a European peace order,” and proclaimed: “nationalism is war”. 15  
 
All of these statements make the pronounced identification of the Euro as necessary for European 
identity and peace, the alternative of which would be a return to Germanys past and the possibility of 
war. 
 
 
5. The Economic Interest Debate  
 
Political and interest group elites also engaged in an economic cost- benefit debate concerning the 
acceptance of the final stage of the EMU. The main components of this debate revolved around the 
advantages of having a common currency and the drawbacks of rejecting the Euro. The advantages 
described were that the Euro would make the common market more efficient and more competitive on 
the international market. These arguments were tied to an understanding that a common currency 
would bring lower prices, better resource allocation, certainty of investment (through transparency of 
the economy), and that this would lead to higher productivity, growth, and competitiveness. Elites also 
argued that the Euro would eliminate currency fluctuations and transaction costs, as well as prevent 
the overvaluation of the D-mark. 
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP) stated that the Euro was the “logical end stone” of the 
common market, emphasizing that a stronger common market would bring all Europeans “more 
growth, employment, and prosperity” 16 These statements exemplify Kinkel’s belief that an efficient 
common market would be beneficial for Germany. The SPD executive committee described the Euro 
as able to increase “the overall economic efficiency of the EU market,” as well as being necessary for 
the European economy “to profit within international competition.”17 Rudolf Seiters, deputy chairman 
of the CDU/CSU committee, reiterated what the SPD executive committee had said by declaring, “the 
Euro strengthens the European position in the world economy”.18 Rudolf Seiters described the Euro as 
able to make the common market more efficient, based on the logic that investments would be easier 
with a common currency. He portrayed this by saying that it would be beneficial for Europe to have “a 
common currency in connection with the Single European Market”, underlining that a European 
common currency “would make investment easier.”19 Economic interest groups also favoured the 
Euro, based on the argument that an efficient common market would make Europe and Germany more 
competitive in the international market. Chairman of Mercedes Benz, Helmut Werner declared that 
Europe could not “be competitive in the world” without a common currency20 and maintained that the 
Euro was “the last chance for Europe” in relation to nations such as the USA, Japan, and Southeast 
Asia.21  
 
Political elites and business interest groups in Germany also emphasized that a stable common 
currency would end currency fluctuations and transaction costs. Jürgen Trittin from alliance 90/Die 
Grünen expressed that die Grünen (Greens) were fundamentally “for a common European currency,” 
and that Germany needed “firm rates of exchange between all important European Union countries”, 
                                                          
15 29.04.1998, Die Zeit: ”Durch eine gemeinsame Waehrung eint Helmut Kohl die Europaeer, aber die 
Deutschen wenden sich von ihm ab. Chronik eines Triumphes im Angesicht der Niederlage“ 
16 31.10.1995, F.A.Z.: „Kinkel: Währungsunion ist nicht „irgendeine Idee“ . The same argument was used by 
Reinhard Kudiss from the Federation of German Industry (BDI) - 1996/27, Der Spiegel: “Starke lobby für den 
Euro” 
17 31.10.1995, F.A.Z.: „Die SPD-Führung sieht sich in der Rolle des Mahners“.  
18 11.10.1995, Die Welt:  “Die Waehrungsunion ist keine Waehrungsreform” 
19 11.10.1995, Die Welt: “Die Waehrungsunion ist keine Waehrungsreform” 
20 02.12.1995, F.A.Z.: „Standpunkte: Helmut Werner – Keine Alternative zur Währungsunion“ 
21 1996/17, Der Spiegel: “Die letzte Chance”  
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because of “the costs of the currency fluctuations on German exports into European Union countries.” 
22 Klaus Kinkel (FDP) declared that exchange rate fluctuations were damaging to the German 
economy, stressing that if the Euro was not adopted, it would lead to a loss of economic growth and 
higher unemployment. Kinkel stated in 1997 that fluctuations in the exchange rate cost Germany “one 
per cent growth in 1995 and a loss of 350,000 to 700,000 jobs across the European Union”.23 Kinkel 
argued, “Mercedes in 1995 had exchange rate costs of 600 million, BMW lost a billion, and Siemens 
approximately 400 million D-Mark.”24 Helmut Werner claimed that currency fluctuations had a 
catastrophic effect on German “competitive ability”, meaning that economic progress was “destroyed 
within a short time.” 25 Helmut Werner also stated, in 1996, that the changes in European currencies 
alone cost Mercedes-Benz “600 Million D-Mark last year”(1995).26 Manfred Gentz, from Daimler-
Benz, proclaimed that the Euro as beneficial for Germany because transaction costs between 
currencies in Europe would end. Gentz estimated that the Daimler-Benz-company paid “100 million 
D-Mark” for European currencies transaction costs a year.27  
 
Finally, it was also argued that the Euro should be adopted to prevent the D-Mark from being 
overvalued, which would be damaging for the German economy. In connection with the 125th year 
anniversary of Dresdner Bank, Chancellor Kohl and the German Minister of Economics, Günter 
Rexrodt, stressed that if the final stage of the EMU were postponed, it would have a negative impact 
on Germany because of the prospects for an overvalued currency. The governmental coalition stated 
that a postponement of the EMU would “make the D-Mark overvalued”, leading to a “loss of 
exports”.28  
 
These statements also indicate a fear of postponing the Euro, emphasising the negative consequences 
of not launching the Euro in 1999. 
 
 
6. The Stability Debate 
 
Preceding the German political parties’ acceptance of the Euro in 1998, the ability of the Euro to 
secure price stability was heavily discussed and debated.  
 
This discourse emphasised central bank independence as well as the need for strict fulfilment of 
convergence criteria by all member states. From the perspective of identity analysis, central bank 
independence and convergence criteria fulfilment were seen, in Germany, as a way of overcoming the 
“other”, or Germany’s own past of hyperinflation, and having economic success, through policies of 
low inflation and controlled budget deficits. Unlike the European identity debate which constantly 
favoured the EMU, German political elites and interest groups participating in the stability debate 
expressed that the EMU was contingent upon price stability. If price stability could not be sufficiently 
secured, a choice in favour of stability could lead to a rejection of the Euro being launched in 1999.   
 
The German discourse about ensuring price stability arose in 1993, with a discussion about the 
institutionalization and competencies of the (EMI). During 1994 and 1995 German elites put pressure 
on other EU-member states and proposed the Stability Pact in order to ensure that other states 
complied with the strict fulfillment of the convergence criteria. Around the time of the Stability Pact 
                                                          
22 31.10.1995, F.A.Z.: „Kinkel: Währungsunion ist nicht „irgendeine Idee“ 
23 13.03.1997, Die Welt: “Verschiebung wäre ein Ruckschlag” and 13.03.1997, Die Welt: “Verschiebung wäre 
ein Ruckschlag”.  
24 13.03.1997, Die Welt: “Verschiebung wäre ein Ruckschlag” 
25 02.12.1995, F.A.Z.: „Standpunkte: Helmut Werner – Keine Alternative zur Währungsunion“ 
26 1996/17, Der Spiegel: ”Die letzt Chance” 
27 08.09.1997, Die Welt: “Offener Streit um den Euro” 
28 10.06.1997, Die Welt: “Kohl und Rexrodt:-Euro-Diskussion schadet wirtschaft” 
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proposal (1995-1996), a change in discourse occurred, shifting the focus away from fulfillment of 
convergence criteria, and focusing instead on the starting date of the Euro. From late 1995, both 
political and business elites produced public statements, assuring that stability would be secure with 
the starting date of the Euro in 1999. These statements of assurance also stressed the fact that it was 
absolutely necessary for the Euro to start in 1999, implicitly expressing that delay of the Euro was not 
an option. There were also elites who emphasized that the starting date was more important than strict 
fulfillment of convergence criteria, and those who emphasized that stability should be prioritized 
ahead of the starting date for the Euro. Throughout this public debate, the Bundesbank consistently 
stressed that price stability and convergence criteria had to be respected.  
 
Discourse about securing price stability through an independent central bank was present in 
connection with the institutionalization and the competences assigned to the EMI, leading up to the 
establishment of the EMI on January 1st, 1994 (the second stage of EMU).29 Before the actual decision 
of where to place the EMI and ECB was made on October 29th, 1993, Chancellor Kohl stated that both 
institutions (EMI and ECB) should be located in the same place.30 Kohl wanted to make sure that “the 
EMI and ECB would be placed in Frankfurt”, hereby underlineing the German norm of price stability 
by sending the message that the ECB would be just as committed as the Bundesbank to securing price 
stability.31 The acceptance of this message can be seen in 1995, when Klaus Kinkel, German Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, stated that: “the independence of the ECB in Frankfurt will help to guarantee price 
stability.”32 Rudolf Seiters, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU committee, discussed the impact that 
the placement of the EMI in Frankfurt would have on Germans. Seiters said that placing the 
forerunner of the European Central Bank, the EMI, in Frankfurt “has, and will continue to have, a 
major psychological effect on Germans”.33 Seiters also describes the connection that would be made 
between the EMI and the positive attitudes and trust that Germans had in the Bundesbank because of 
its ability to assure price stability in Germany.34  
 
During 1994 and 1995, an extensive discourse developed, placing a strong emphasis on the strict 
fulfillment of the convergence criteria and placing particular pressure on other member countries, due 
to their non-fulfillment of the convergence criteria. Again the German political elites and interest 
groups were stressing the norm of price stability, in this instance by putting pressure on other states to 
pursue policies of low inflation and controlled budgets. Securing low inflation policies can be seen in 
this discourse as a prerequisite for German acceptance of the EMU. In 1994, the German Finance 
Minister Theo Waigel expressed that he was “disapointed that the convergence criteria were not 
respected by any other EU Member States besides Germany and Luxembourg”, and stressed that 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain had to fulfill the convergence criteria. 35 By naming the countries in 
violation, Waigel was placing them in the out-group, in order to add further pressure for those 
countries to meet the convergence criteria. In July of the same year, the German government 
articulated concerns that the Commission would not be able to secure price stability and controlled 
budget deficits by other EU Member States, when the Commission did not take action against Ireland 
exceeding the debt criteria.36 Then, in 1995, German Finance Minister Theo Waigel insisted that “the 
pressure to fulfill the stability criteria will not diminish,”37  and later emphasized that “the emphasis 
                                                          
29 The two main tasks of the EMI were to strengthen central bank cooperation and monetary policy co-
ordination, and to make the preparations required for the establishment of the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB), for the conduct of the single monetary policy and for the creation of a single currency in the third stage. 
30 29.10.1993, F.A.Z.: „EG-Gipfelteilnehmer wollen über Währungsinstitut entscheiden” 
31 29.10.1993, F.A.Z.: „EG-Gipfelteilnehmer wollen über Währungsinstitut entscheiden” 
32 31.10.1995, F.A.Z.: „Kinkel: Währungsunion ist nicht „irgendeine Idee“  
33 02.12.1995, F.A.Z.: „Welches Europa wollen wir? Erwartungen an die Regierungskonferenz 1996“ 
34 02.12.1995, F.A.Z.: „Welches Europa wollen wir? Erwartungen an die Regierungskonferenz 1996“ 
35 15.02.1994, F.A.Z.: „Nur zwei Länder erfüllen die Maastricht-Kriterien“  
36 05.07.1994, F.A.Z.: „Neuer Streit um die Maastrichter Kriterien“  
37 28.06.1995, F.A.Z.: „Waigel: Die europäische Währung darf nicht Ecu heissen“ - The statement was made in 
the broader context of a discussion about the European Council meeting in Madrid, December 1995, where it 
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on price stability will last.” 38 The FDP chairman, Wolfgang Gerhardt, pointed out that there was 
pressure on the member states of the European Union to “ensure stable budgets, to fulfill the criteria 
laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, and to maintain price stability.”39  
 
On the 10th of November 1995, the Federal German Finance Ministry and Finance Minister Theo 
Waigel proposed the Stability Pact. During this time, other EU-member countries’ were observed by 
Germany as not fulfilling the convergence criteria, the euro was postponed at the Madrid Summit in 
1995, and the planed start of the euro in 1999 was drawing nearer. These events put Germany in a 
difficult situation. Based on a construction of the European identity norm, and economic advantages, 
the German political elites can be seen as wanting to launch the EMU in 1999. However, it was also 
necessary for elites to insure price stability for the future of the EMU. In November of 1995, the 
Stability Pact was proposed, in order to secure controlled budget deficits and price stability through 
issuing penalties to non-compliant countries. In the Stability Pact proposal, Theo Waigel expressed 
that the “goal of the German initiative” was “to make the Monetary Union more acceptable for 
Germany,” and for the EMU to be “a stability-community” in the long run.40 In an article in Der 
Spiegel, Bundesbank President Hans Tietmeyer was also said to be more optimistic about securing “a 
stability oriented monetary union” through the Stability Pact.41 The Stability Pact proposal served the 
purpose of reassuring the elites that the EMU would adhere to the principle of price stability. 
 
Around the time of the Stability Pact proposal (late 1995), a change in stability discourse occurred. 
This debate refocused on the starting date of the Euro, rather than on convergence criteria fulfillment. 
Both political and business elites produced public statements assuring of stability in the EMU. Waigel 
said, that there was no possibility of a ‘weak euro’ due to the institution of the Stability Pact.42 Rudolf 
Seiters (CDU/CSU) stressed: “The priority of price stability and of independence of the future ECB 
has been clearly formulated, even more clearly than is the case with the Bundesbank.”43 This 
declaration is meant to assure people in Germany that the ECB will not only be as stable, but also 
possibly even more stable, than the Bundesbank. The chairman of the executive committee of 
Mercedes Benz, Helmut Werner, affirmed that without the strict fulfillment of the stability criteria, 
“no one, not even the German industry, would want to join the EMU.”44 According to this statement, 
German industry would never agree to the EMU if they did not believe that the stability criteria would, 
and could, be fulfilled. In 1996, the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, also stated: “Whoever thinks 
that Germans are so Euro-fanatic that they would give up their concern for stability, is mistaken”.45 
Here, Kohl was giving his assurance that the priority for stability would not waver, even if it were in 
conflict with European identity. In 1997, Helmut Kohl declared, before the Bundestag, that the federal 
government would do everything that it could, to “enable the start of the Euro as scheduled, and make 
sure that it would be durable over time.” 46 This statement assures that both norms of European 
identity (by starting on schedule), and Stability (by being durable over time) will be achieved. 
Emphasis placed on the starting date also reveals a strong desire not to delay the introduction of the 
Euro past 1999. The German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel restated that neither European identity 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
was decided to change the name of the common currency from Ecu to Euro, and not to start the third stage of the 
EMU until the 1st of January, 1999. 
38 18.12.1995, F.A.Z.: „Banken begrüssen den Euro-Beschluss“  
39 31.10.1995, F.A.Z.: „Kinkel: Währungsunion ist nicht „irgendeine Idee“ 
40 11.11.1995, F.A.Z: „Stabilitätspakt soll die Währungsunion sichern“  
41 1996/49, Der Spiegel: “Der Termin steht im Vertrag“ 
42 11.07.1997, Die Welt: ”An Strukturreformen führt kein Weg vorbei” 
43 11.10.1995. Die Welt: “Die Waehrungsunion ist keine Waehrungsreform“ 
44 02.12.1995, F.A.Z.: „Standpunkte: Helmut Werner – Keine Alternative zur Währungsunion“ 
45 23.11.1996, Die Welt: “Kohl erklaert EWU zur Schicksalsfrage” 
46 28.06.1997, Die Welt: “Kohl versichert: Euro kommt pünktlich” and 04.04.1997, Die Welt: “Kohl verbreitet 
Optimismus” 
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nor price stability was in danger when he declared: “The Euro must and will come as scheduled on the 
1st of January 1999, with strict fulfilment of convergence criteria.” 47  
 
It is clear that not all elites felt assured that both the starting date in 1999 and convergence criteria 
fulfillment could be achieved. Some statements prioritized the starting date of 1999 ahead of 
convergence criteria fulfillment. According to Der Spiegel, there were many German banks and 
industry representatives who were in favor of starting the Euro even if the stability criteria had to be 
softened.48 For example, Manfred Schneider, the Head of the Board at Bayer, stated that he would like 
the Euro area to include all of the big states of the EU from the beginning – independently of 
fulfilment of Maastricht convergence criteria.49 Also, in an open letter, ex-chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
accused the Bundesbank president, Hans Tietmeyer, of putting to much emphasis on the fulfilment of 
the convergence criteria. Schmidt implied that Tietmeyer would have personal motives for not starting 
the EMU on time, saying that Tietmeyer would be “downgraded from de facto monetary king to the 
branch office director of the ECB.”50 Despite his personal attack on Tietmeyer, Schmidt was also 
displaying the fact that he valued the starting date above strict convergence criteria fulfilment. 
 
Other elites prioritized convergence criteria fulfillment ahead of the starting date for the Euro. In 1997, 
Minister of Bavaria Edmund Stoiber (CSU) argued: “We must interpret stability criteria strictly and 
narrowly. This has primacy over timetable.,..I also represent people from the street, and for them 
inflation has catastrophic consequences. For people from the streets, stability is the most social 
thing.”51 This states clearly that Stoiber prioritized convergence criteria ahead of a starting date, 
fearing the social consequences of an unstable Euro. According to Die Welt, Minister President of 
Bavaria Edmund Stoiber (CSU), the Minister President of Saxony Kurt Biedenkopf (CDU), and the 
Minister President of Lower Saxony Gerhard Schroeder (SPD), all favoured the beginning of the third 
stage of the EMU with the number of states, which fulfilled the convergence criteria, and were against 
the “soft” (or political) interpretation of criteria.52 Postponing the Euro in Germany past the 1st of 
January 1999 shows the clear prioritisation of convergence criteria fulfilment ahead of the starting date 
of the Euro.    
 
The Bundesbank can be seen as a consistent actor throughout the entire debate over whether Germany 
should join the third stage of the EMU, emphasising price stability and fulfilment of convergence 
criteria as preconditions for launching the EMU. Bundesbank President Hans Tietmeyer said that the 
Maastricht Criteria “are not going to be diluted.”53  On the 27th of March 1998, Hans Tietmeyer 
presented the position of the Bundesbank at the cabinet meeting of German CDU/CSU government on 
the commitment to strict fulfillment of the convergence criteria by the European states. Tietmeyer 
stated that the entrance into the EMU was “stabilitetspolitisch vertretbar”, meaning stability-politically 
tenable. However, Tietmeyer also pointed out that some states were not able to dismantle the concerns 
of others “about the sustainability of their fiscal situation.”54 Franz-Christoph Zeitler, member of the 
Bundesbank council and the president of Landeszentralbank in Bavaria, expressed the same concerns 
as the Bundesbank president, and stressed that the decision to launch the Euro in 1999 was purely “a 
political one.”55 The statement by Franz-Christoph Zeitler exemplifies the strong concerns within the 
Bundesbank about whether the principle of price stability would be respected in the EMU. 
                                                          
47 05.09.1997, F.A.Z.: “Kinkel: Der Euro wird pünktlich kommen” 
48 27/1996, Der Spiegel: “Starke lobby für den Euro” 
49 27/1996, Der Spiegel: “Starke lobby für den Euro”  
50 08.11.1996, Die Zeit: “Helmut Schmidt: OffenerBrief an Bundesbankspräsident Hans Tietmeyer” 
51 28.06.1997, Die Welt: “Eine Euro-Verschiebung mündet nicht im Chaos” 
52 08.09.1997, Die Welt: “Offener Streit um den Euro” 
53 15.05.1995, F.A.Z.: „Vor 1999 keine Einheitswährung“  
54 28.03.1998, F.A.Z.: „Währungsunion stabilitätspolitisch vertretbar“ 
55 28.03.1998, F.A.Z.: „Währungsunion stabilitätspolitisch vertretbar“ 
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7. Linking social constructivism, rational choice and the German debate on the EMU 
 
In this section we attempt to connect the three public debates through a theoretical analysis, which can 
answer the research question as to why Germany joined the EMU. 
 
During the European identity debate, elites emphasised their understanding of the EMU as a means to 
overcoming the national socialist past of WWII. The idea of a ‘United States of Europe’ was first put 
forward in Germany in 1925 by the Heidelberg program, after which it was banished by the Nazi 
regime during WWII. Scholars such as Marcussen et al. (1999) have argued that the existence of the 
‘United States of Europe’ concept before the Nazi regime made it particularly salient after WWII, 
when the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) used the concept of European unification as the 
alternative to the National Socialism supported by the Nazis. It was based upon this European identity 
construction that Germany’s past (WWII and the Nazi regime) came to represent the other, or ‘out-
group’ for Germans after that time. 
 
The end of WWII brought about a critical juncture in Germany, when the amount of information that 
contradicted the German National Socialist identity became unbearable. The new identity 
construction, which was introduced as an alternative to National Socialism, was that of ‘European’ 
identity. The concept of a ‘United States of Europe’ that supported a ‘European’ rather than 
‘Nationalist’ identity provided an in-group with which the German population was once again able to 
feel a sense of collective positive identity. Over time, European identity became a more stable concept, 
as it was used to bolster and strengthen the integrity of political institutions in Germany.    
 
The European Monetary Union was yet another institution which was tied to European identity in 
Germany. Statements such as ‘introducing the euro… to build a united Europe’ exemplify a strong 
tendency of the political elite to identify and place themselves with the in-group of European identity 
in Germany. The out-group, in this case those who would consider a delay of the Euro, were given the 
clear message: ‘Nationalism is war’, relating anyone questioning the starting date of the Euro in 1999 
to Germany’s National Socialist past.    
 
The heavy emphasis in the German debate 1993 to 1998 on the norm of securing price stability and a 
stable Euro can be viewed as an identity construction particular to Germany. As also argued by other 
scholars, the memory of the devastating social effects of two hyperinflations and the rise of Nazism, 
followed by the subsequent economic success (Wirtsschaftwunder) in 1950s by adhering to the 
principle of price stability, endowed the German population with a sense of collective pride. This has 
been identified as leading to the belief that price stability policies in the form of an independent central 
bank, policies of low inflation, and controlled budget deficits were a crucial precondition for economic 
success and stable social order (Merlingen, 2005; Maes, 2004; Dyson/Featherstone, 1999; Rieter et al., 
1993). Thus, the public debate about stability, which existed leading up to the start date of the Euro in 
1999, can also be seen as an identity norm originating in the late 1940s, when order was restored to the 
German market economy following WWII. Here, Germany’s other is once again defined as 
Germany’s past during WWII, when the devastating consequences of two hyperinflations and a world 
economic crisis were felt. When considering the EMU, the German elite also took these norms and 
values into consideration. First, by creating an independent European Central Bank and placing it in 
the same place as the Bundesbank, Germany could continue to be tied to the concept of an 
independent central bank. Additionally, placing considerable pressure on fulfilling the convergence 
criteria emphasized the aspects of Germany’s price stability culture.  
 
The proposal of the Stability Pact was yet another event that exemplified the norm of price stability, 
through focusing on policies of low inflation and controlled budget deficits. Theodore Waigel’s 
statement that the goal of the EMU was to create a ’stability-community’ for Germany explicitly states 
the desire to have the EMU conform to principals of price stability. The following year, in 1996, 
Helmut Kohl stated: ’whoever thinks that Germans are so Euro-fanatic that they would give up their 
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concern for stability, is mistaken.’ This clearly shows the extreme importance of the price stability 
norm in Germany, which was also shown to place extreme pressure on other countries to make 
reforms and conform to the ordo-liberal policies practiced in Germany. By the time of the 1998 
Bundestag and Bundesrat votes, all EMU countries were extremely close to meeting the convergence 
criteria. Also, if any country did not meet convergence criteria in the future, the Stability Pact 
specified a specific course of action to be taken.  
 
Economic cost/benefit calculations were also a key part of the elite considerations being taken into 
account when voting in favour of the Euro. This public debate from 1994 to 1998 revolved around the 
economic benefits of accepting the Euro, and the economic drawbacks of not accepting the Euro. 
From a social-constructivist standpoint, economic market rationality/rational choice thought in politics 
can be seen as influencing the German elites perception of the EMU as a normative trend in present 
day politics. As argued by scholars studying social constructions, it has become more acceptable to 
base decisions on economic cost/benefit analyses (Gill, 1995; Ruggie, 1995; Finnemore 1996; Risse; 
2004). The debate about Germany joining the EMU was no exception to this norm.  Klaus Kinkel 
stated that the EMU would bring ‘more growth, employment and prosperity.’ Kohl and Rexrodt 
stressed that an overvalued D-mark would lead to a ‘loss of exports.’ These are two prime examples of 
elites using economic rational-choice considerations as the “normal” way of explaining the EMU 
when judging whether or not the Euro was a good idea for Germany. The German economic debate 
demonstrates that the German elite valued rational choice calculations, and that they were considered 
as factors for joining the common currency. 
 
Through the application of a social-constructivist framework, focusing on national identities and 
cost/benefit calculations as normative values, the German public debate leading up to the Bundestag 
and Bundesrat decisions in 1998 can now be explained more completely. The German public debate, 
which took place between 1993 and 1998, was necessary for creating a shared consensus on what was 
in Germany’s best interest. The empirical research presented in this article exemplifies the importance 
of the German public debate: developing and shifting political actors’ preferences; as well as 
constructing policies, which concluded with the Euro being perceived by elite’s to be in Germanys 
national interest. In answer to the question of why Germany joined the EMU, European and economic 
considerations were seen as favouring the Euro, and price stability was seen as able to be secured 
through the Stability Pact, rendering the initiation of the Euro in 1999 as tenable. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This article dispels two common and persistent misconceptions in analyzing the important question: 
Why did Germany decide to join the EMU? The first misconception is that the EMU was finalized in 
1991 with the Maastricht Treaty, thereby leaving the Euro ‘locked-in’. Contrary to this conception, a 
public debate took place in Germany, which made the EMU acceptable on a national level, without 
which the Euro may have been postponed.  
 
The second misconception is that by using either economic interest based or constructivist European 
integration theories, using one automatically exclude the other, along with that theory’s coinciding 
observable empirical characteristics. Although ontological perspectives are fundamentally opposed, by 
understanding cost/benefit analysis as a socially acceptable norm, cost/benefit analysis becomes an 
observable aspect of the social constructivist framework, and economic outcomes are explained 
theoretically, without excluding other norms and values. 
 
On the basis of discourse analysis we argue that the German elites’ perception of the EMU was 
formed through and by the debate taking place from 1993 to 1998, which ultimately led to the 
decisions to join the EMU as late as 1998. Through this debate the elite became convinced that the 
EMU would benefit Germany economically and would not lead to instability. The notion was 
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furthermore created that the EMU was an integrated part of German European identity. Finally, the 
debate convinced the German elite that the EMU was a matter of urgency – if postponement occurred 
yet again, stability might be damaged, economic benefits would be lost, and European integration 
would suffer immensely. In other words, a vote in favor of postponing the Euro past 1999 could have 
altered the whole course of the EMU and hence of EU as we know it. 
 
Previous analyses of the German decision have been focused on the period prior to Maastricht and the 
academic contributions have tended to focus on either German Europeanism (like Risse et. al), the 
possible economic advantages (like Moravscik) or the fact that the German said yes because the EMU 
was modeled after the German model (like Dyson and Featherstone). Our analysis suggests that all of 
these motivations were underlying the German decision to join – overlapping and mutually 
strengthening the argument for German participation.  
 
This complexity also implies that it is impossible to understand the German decision without applying 
a multi-dimensional theoretical framework. By applying only one theory, previous contributions by 
necessity only cope with parts of the complex motives underlying the German decision to join the 
EMU, which explains why the German decision has continued to be a puzzle.  
 
The most important achievement of the German debate was that it established a link between the EMU 
and how the elite perceived German interests. By applying a social-constructivist framework, we have 
thus demonstrated that identity constructions, which included rational-choice considerations, were 
important normative values underlying the German acceptance of the EMU.  
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